Abstract. The 2001 foot and mouth disease (FMD) epidemic in the United Kingdom resulted in the popularisation of the concept of biosecurity. At its most basic, biosecurity refers to simple cleansing and disinfecting, but during the FMD epidemic it became associated with a powerful system of surveillance. We characterise surveillance as a thing in itself, a mode of ordering that can be added to others. The establishment and maintenance of categories are fundamental to the practice of surveillance, but social studies of surveillance have not yet fully realised the way such categorisation operates within the nonhuman and the spatial. Strange materialities are those things which do not quite belong within a particular order. We examine the actions of surveillance in the world of strange materialities that was the FMD epidemic. Here we see that surveillant practices acted on the nonhuman FMD virus by constructing territories to control humans. Surveillance seems to proceed as the translation of a worldview (a system of categorisation) into materiality and we conclude with some thoughts on what this may mean for geographical studies of technical, biological, and human materialities in which surveillant processes are at work.
Introduction
For just over seven months in 2001 the United Kingdom experienced an epidemic of foot and mouth disease (FMD) of a magnitude for which the government and statutory agencies were wholly unprepared. The epidemic was costly, both financially and emotionally, and many of its impacts outlasted the disease itself. Bringing the epidemic under control, however, involved considerably more than the measures represented by cliche¨d media imagery of slaughtered animals, burial pits, and mass pyres. Behind the fac°ade of these more visually arresting activities a new technical concept was being introduced to (and imposed on) livestock farmers and eventually also to the general public. In this paper we examine the actions undertaken under the auspices of`biosecurity', a term that refers principally to a set of simple procedures intended to prevent the coincidental spread of disease through normal activities; actions such as washing hands and disinfecting clothes and vehicles can contribute to biosecurity. Although it is an internationally recognised term, prior to the 2001 FMD epidemic biosecurity was largely unheard of in the United Kingdom. As a result of being introduced in the midst of a crisis, FMD biosecurity in the United Kingdom developed its own particular expression in practice ö responding to the dynamic needs and constraints imposed upon it by the FMD epidemic. Receiving its first mention in the House of Commons on 9 April 2001 (Hansard, 2001) , biosecurity also became a highly politicised term. It was touted as a banner of good practice for farmers and consequently seen by the farming community as a way of shifting the blame for the government's failings in disease management onto farmers. The evolving practice of biosecurity eventually produced a highly spatialised form of control, reliant on the creation and maintenance of tightly categorised territories through control of physical movement and information. Therefore, in this paper we discuss biosecurity as a form of surveillance and in doing so address some aspects of surveillance of pertinence to geographers.
We propose that surveillance can be seen as a distinct`worldview' and`mode of ordering' in modern culture and that issues of categorisation have increased importance as a result of the growing prominence of new and more visible technologies of surveillance. Social studies of surveillance have, as yet, failed to get to grips with nonhuman and material worlds to any great extent beyond examining the role of developing technologies. Given the deployment of surveillant processes within veterinary and medical practice and across diverse domains of governance, production, and consumption, this represents a serious discontinuity. The obvious need to engage with the nonhuman within the spheres of surveillant operation is exemplified by controversies such as the FMD epidemic. Therefore, we situate our analysis broadly amongst certain theoretical trends within geography that have called for and sought greater engagement with the material and the nonhuman (for example, Whatmore, 2002) . Our analysis stems from a consideration of the materialities of both FMD itself and FMD biosecurity. Central to the practice of surveillance are processes of categorisation and ordering, and we would argue that these are also significant to the theoretical concerns of new trajectories within the nature/culture domain (and beyond) which discard dualisms in favour of hybridity and an attendant concern with materiality (see Castree, 2003; Whatmore, 2002) .
These theories propose new categories to apprehend more adequately the entangled and impure nature of the social and the material. Howsoever we categorise and classify, it seems that there will always be things that fall outside or that do not quite belong (Bowker and Star, 1999) . Things that do not quite belong might arise when a situation is subjected to interpretation by multiple overlapping worldviews (or systems of classification). A strange materiality is just such a thing: a very real hybrid entity that cannot be ignored, that exists in and interferes with materialities that are perceived to be otherwise properly ordered. The strange materiality in the title of this paper is FMD itself. The presence of FMD within a population of farm animals is not`un-natural', but it is, within a number of different worldviews, undesirable. In examining the methods employed in surveilling such strange materialities we first review current trajectories and shortcomings within the transdisciplinary field of surveillance studies.
Surveillance, disease, and territoriality Surveillance has become an increasingly important object of study across disciplines, and this interest has spawned the growing transdisciplinary field of surveillance studies (Lyon, 2002) . The key foundational text in modern social studies of surveillance is Foucault's Surveiller et Puniröunfortunately translated as Discipline and Punish (1975) öalthough, in the United States, interest had also been sparked by increased attention to the methods of the police and intelligence services in the late 1960s and early 1970s (for example, Rule, 1973 ). Foucault's work concentrated on direct supervision of the body, leading to a new`bio-politics', and also on the indirect and internalised moral effects that created self-supervision. However, advances in the technologies of sensing and recording have enabled both a massive growth in monitoring and a shift to the sifting of data rather than the physical monitoring or confinement of the body itself (Deleuze, 1995; Gandy, 1993; Lianos, 2001; Lyon, 1994; Poster, 1990) . For Marx, this`new surveillance' (1988) is characterised by``the use of technical means to extract or create personal data _ taken from individuals or contexts'' (2002, page 12; see also Graham and Wood, 2003) . Thus it has been argued that the monitored today are not individual persons or subjects but`dividuals' (Deleuze, 1995) or multiple`data subjects' (Lyon, 1994) .
However, from the pioneering study of Rule (1973) onwards, definitions of surveillance in social science remain fundamentally connected to the human body, whether individually or collectively, in totality or in fractured parts or traces. Dandeker (1990) sees it as``the gathering of information about and the supervision of subject populations in organisations'' (page vii). More recently, Lyon (2001) has defined surveillance as``any collection and processing of personal data, whether identifiable or not, for the purpose of influencing and managing those whose data have been garnered'' (page 2). These definitions are lacking in two areas, both of which are crucial in the analysis of FMD biosecurity. First, they do not encompass surveillance of the nonhuman: natural resources, weather, diseases, and so on. Second, in the enthusiasm for the digital, the indirect, and the fractured, the spatial considerations described by Foucault have disappeared.
Surveilling the nonhuman
Surveillance practice encompasses all forms of monitoring and control of human and nonhuman subjects, from individual people and things to groups, ecosystems, and planetary processes. Critical studies have been made of geographic information systems (GIS)ötools which combine maps and databases and which can be used for analysing and displaying information of all types, human and nonhuman, as surveillance (Curry, 1998; Pickles, 1995) . However, acknowledgments that the nonhuman can be subject to surveillance are rare in the social sciences. In the context of medical science, the terminology of surveillance is universally acknowledged and used beyond the human, although there are significant differences from the terminology of the social sciences. In medicine, surveillance refers in particular to systematic centralised monitoring of disease vectors for alert, containment, and eradication. However, this use should be familiar to social scientists, as medical surveillance was central in Foucault's Surveiller et Punir. Although it is known primarily for advocating a spatial-architectural model of surveillance through an analysis of Bentham's reformatory design, the panopticon, the genealogy of Foucault's panoptic machine begins with the creation of categories of infected and infectious persons during an outbreak of plague in France (Foucault, 1975) . Elden has argued further that Foucault's conceptualisation of surveillance begins in the biopolitics of madness and leprosy in earlier works (Elden, 2001) . Disease surveillance systems have operated historically throughout Western societies (compare Declich and Carter, 1994; Foucault, 1973; MacLehose et al, 2002; Mooney, 1999) and have been as contested as the technologies and practices more usually understood as surveillance within social science. And medical science certainly does not regard these practices as entirely isolated and different from`social' forms of surveillance. Indeed, medical surveillance, whether epidemiology or institutional practices within hospitals, involves clearly expressed sets of parameters for categorisation and ordering with a view to the control, treatment, and eradication that have influenced and continue to influence nonmedical forms of surveillance and controlöin particular, law enforcement (Frana, 2002) .
Medical surveillance practices still clearly involve the surveillance of the human body. Largely the same practices apply to agriculture, and in particular to domestic animal disease surveillance, which is our focus here. However, the motivations for veterinary surveillance are primarily economic, focusing on the`viability' of the livestock industry rather than Hippocratic or humanitarian motivations as the recent Royal Society report into diseases in livestock noted (The Royal Society, 2002) and``contrasts _ have been drawn with the procedures used to treat human infectious diseases'' (page 4).
`Surveillance biosecurity'öthe terms are frequently found together in this wayöis a transnational activity with a set of responsibilities distributed amongst various bodies. The Office International des E è pizooties collects and disseminates information about animal disease outbreaks and spread, whilst the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation assists in programmes to control and eradicate diseases. In Europe, the European Union and member state governments have responsibility for policy and practical implementation, respectively. The Office International des E è pizooties is strongly associated with the World Trade Organisationöespecially the development of the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement, in particular through its Animal Health Codeö which connects disease surveillance to broader transnational economic surveillance networks. These are another set of surveillant practices not often regarded as being within the purview of social studies of surveillance (but see Gill, 1995) , which are also important in the case of FMD, as the strategies for containment and eradication had probably more to do with international trade rules than with anything else (see below).
Surveillance and space
If accounts of surveillance have, as yet, failed to examine the manifest surveillance of nonhumans, they have also been remiss in their treatment of spatial concerns in humanfocused surveillance. Although there have been many empirical sociological, sociolegal, and criminological studies of surveillance in particular localesötoo many to list hereö none of the main contemporary theorists of surveillance, whether Weberian, Marxian, neo-Machiavellian, or Foucauldian, are sufficiently spatial. Some studies of local instances of surveillance come from an urban geographic perspective (for example, Fyfe and Bannister, 1996; Herbert, 1996; McGrail, 1999; Williams and Johnstone, 2000) or from a historical geography tradition (for example, Kneale, 1999; Ogborn, 1992; . These accounts do not generally go far in reconciling theoretical developments in surveillance studies with those in geography. There are few real theoretical accounts of surveillance in the discipline, and some seem almost perversely hamstrung by the need to appear obviously`geographical'. For example, Hannah's very basic piece on a time^space geography of panopticism (1997) explains the genealogy of the panopticon as a spatial form and its implications for everyday movement in a data-dominated society. However, the article lacks the necessary engagement with surveillance studies and its conclusions are thus limited to the finding that there is``a socio-economic stratification in the dimension of visibility'' (page 359). Graham (1998) provides more stimulation in his attempt to align geographic theory with the Baudrillardian simulation approach of Bogard (1996) . However, the technologically based nature of this piece means that one fundamental aspect of`simulation' is missed. Simulation is an example of a particular form of technologically mediated social representation that, significantly, relies on the formulation of categories. Others concentrate too much on aspects of certain technologies to be generally applicable; for example, Koskela (2000) , in focusing on CCTV, falls into`the panoptic trap' of aligning surveillance purely with vision when this is an aspect of particular forms, technologies, and practices of surveillance. As Elden (2001) and Norris (2003) have both recently pointed out, if one reads the whole of Surveiller et Punir, rather than simply half a chapter, Foucault's`panoptic machine' was only very partially based on vision; rather, at its root, it was founded on the establishment of categories. Theorising visibility then does not provide in itself a general understanding of`surveillance', and especially not in the case of biosecurity.
In the case of the 2001 UK FMD epidemic there were, as we will see, determined and detailed attempts to control space and movement, through the construction of categories and their imposition onto space. Examining this process requires an understanding of the practices of power in relation to space. As Elden (2001) has recently argued, rather than it being simply that questions of space are inherently political, this is the case because``politics is inherently spatial'' (page 151). We draw on Sack's theory of human territoriality to explain the simultaneous construction of space and identity that must take place in order for powerful action to be expressed (Sack, 1986 ). Sack's theory argues that there are particular forms of spatial construction fundamental to human social behaviour that involve the delineation and definition of particular areas of space^time, and, at the same time, the behaviour expected in regard to these areas. These forms he calls territoriality, and the space so defined he calls a territory. These territories range from the most ordinary acts, such as a parent telling a child not to enter the kitchen, to complex sociospatial constructs such as military bases. Sack defines three forms of behaviour necessary for the creation and maintenance of a territory: definition, communication, and enforcement. The boundaries must be established, their presence and the associated rules communicated, and those rules enforced through the translation of materials and social practices. Without this threefold processöwhich must be constantly maintained if the territory is to be more than a very temporary creationöthe space can be a place, but not a territory. Territoriality also has degrees: places can be more or less territorialised, the strength of the territorialisation depending on the strategies and desires of the actants, and the power relations and materials involved. For example: I may have legal ownership of a field, but my cows will not stay there unless I erect a fence, and other actants may not be aware of my ownership without such an indication.
Surveillance in society
Territoriality is sometimes as simple as a field and a fence, but not often and decreasingly so. Most territories demand behaviours other than simply`keep out', and demand less obvious categorisation than`cow in, people out'. These more complex situations need more complex enforcement, often through surveillant practices. In contemporary society these surveillant practices do not operate in isolation. Indeed, as they (are) spread they interact, either intentionally or accidentally, with others. Surveillant practices also spread from domain to domain; for example, strategies and technologies developed for military purposes reemerge in city-centre management initiatives (Oc and Tiesdale, 2000) . Marx (1995) argued that a process of`surveillance creep' can be seen, whereby technologies developed for one particular purpose become the solution for others. Thus an almost imperceptible self-referential logic of problem and solution emerges which justifies every gradual movement in relation to previous movements and in which, frequently, the technological surveillance solution exists prior to the identification of the problem. Foucault (1975) argued that this generalised spread of surveillance heralded the arrival of a new type of society he called`the panoptical machine'. However, Deleuze (1995) challenged this mechanical metaphor, arguing that the spread of telematics and the digitisation of surveillance meant that surveillance was not centrally controlled but distributed throughout society (see also Haggerty and Ericson, 2000) . Foucault gives a succinct description of the way in which he views surveillance as operating:``although surveillance rests on the individual, its functioning is that of a network of relations ... this network holds the whole together and traverses it in its entirety with effects of power that derive from one another' ' (1975, page 177) . Foucault is using a concept of internal relations: power derives from other effects of power in the network. There has been one overt attempt to apply a relational analysis to surveillance studies and tackle the question of panopticism. Ball (2001; adopts a combination of actor-network theory and Haraway's adaptation of the Marxist notion of commodity fetishism and her conceptualisation of the material-semiotic nature of any scientifically produced object or body. She thus sees surveillance technologies as dense material semiotic interconnections and criticises the fetishism of surveillance technologies that is widespread not only amongst advocates but also amongst academic analysts. The questions asked are all too frequently those of what technologies do to us, how surveillance conditions our behaviour; Ball would prefer an interactional approach, which recognises that surveillance implies a relationship between the human and nonhuman.
Categorisation, worldview, and materiality Running through our account of surveillance biosecurity is the notion that categorisation is central to both the practice and understanding of surveillance. Categorisation can be thought of as the human practice of dividing the world up into``distinct objects and relations''; when this is accomplished humans then``manipulate the physical realities of their environs in terms of the categories they impose upon them'' (Rapport and Overing, 2000, page 32) . The practice of creating categories and assigning things to those categories is also referred to as classification, and has become a more formalised and complex business throughout the modern era, particularly with the advent of information technologies and global infrastructures (Bowker and Star, 1999) .
Categories imply boundaries between them and the essence of boundaries has long occupied anthropologists, beginning in earnest with Barth (1969) öalthough there is an argument that boundaries have always been at the heart of the discipline (Cohen, 2000) . Barth has recently returned to the concept in order to illustrate the`versatility' of the idea of boundaries. In doing so he describes the``three levels of abstraction'' of the notion of boundary: demarcation of territory; demarcation of social groups; and division of categories of the mind (Barth, 2000) . In this extension of the concept, Barth points out that making a categorical distinction does not necessarily imply the drawing of a physical boundary. He provides two examples of this: land and sea are distinct categories yet no exact boundary exists between them, owing to tidal action; the phrasè night and day' is used to denote polar opposites yet the phenomena it refers to are actually phases of a continuous cycle. Following Barth's scheme, it could be said that Bowker and Star (1999) are particularly interested in the connection between categories of the mind and distinct social groups. They look to the problematic`borderlands' where communities of practiceö each with its own set of categories and ways of articulating themömeet within a person and to boundary objects that allow for mutual understanding and cooperation between groups. The work involved in managing multiple categorisations and contingencies is referred to as`categorical work'. In examining the development of biosecurity during the FMD epidemic, we are perhaps more concerned with the links between categorical boundaries associated with different communities of practice and the boundaries which demarcate territories (see following section). Nonetheless, biosecurity involves categorical work and is a good indication of the power of such work. Bowker and Star are concerned with the injustices that can be done through categorical work, the possibility of things and people rendered invisible within certain categorical systems. In their analysis of classification systems, the affordances offered by borderlands and boundary objects (see also Star and Griesemer, 1989) offer an example of how problems arising from categorisation can be overcome. In surveillance and in biosecurity, boundaries serve a very particular function: they deliberately delineate between areas through categorical distinction. Both what is allowed to cross a boundary and the conditions that pertain either side of a boundary are determined by recourse to categorisation. In contrast to boundary objects which allow interaction across a boundary (which is in any case more conceptual than material) surveillance seeks to reinforce boundaries but to imbue them with a differential permeability.
In examining surveillance of the nonhuman, we note that categorisation is also central to the projects of various`postdualist theoreticians' and those who have followed them in the development of what have been termed``relational ontologies and hybrid politics'' (Castree, 2003, page 203) . Through a focus on the qualities and properties of actants that emerge as a result of associations, relationships, and partial connections such views have upset any notion that the material world can be adequately represented by examining easily defined entities in isolation. These theories have entered into geography in part through a desire to find a nondualistic, less human-centred, and more symmetrical approach to examining nature and society (Murdoch, 1997) , the categorical distinction between the two having been cast as an anthropological peculiarity (Latour, 1993) . Another trajectory has turned to such relational theories as a means of overcoming the limits of social constructionist and technological determinist perspectives in analysing`virtual' or`cyber' geographies (Bingham, 1996) . What all of these approaches do is problematise the distinctions inherent in dualisms such as nature/ culture and human/nonhuman. The apparent extrinsic reality of these distinctions has been dispensed withöexposed as the result of a great deal of material-categorical work carried out under the auspices of modern knowledge practices (Latour, 1993; . Seemingly obdurate dualisms have dissolved into continuous, processual relationships with a great deal more fluidity. With these revelations there has been a need to find``other vocabularies than those which divide and`black box' the world into easy categories'' (Bingham, 1996, page 635) . Such frameworks may permit us to apprehend``certain things which were previously concealed by the categorised ways of thinking we have developed'' (Bingham and Thrift, 2000, page 286) .
But as categories are central to human apprehension of the world it is simply not possible to do away with them. What relational ontologies and hybrid politics have provided is a new set of categories and a new way of viewing categorical work, toward explicitly critical political ends (see Whatmore, 2002) . Alongside the concern with more fluid approaches to categorisation there is a focus on materiality that is at the root of postdualist thinking;``beings and things _ are all seen as material, but possessed of different capacities by virtue of their entanglements with other beings and things'' (Castree, 2003, page 207) . This refocusing on materiality also offers reimagining of the social, as the less anthropocentric`association', and of society as that which is constructed through heterogeneous associations (Latour, 1986) . Hinchliffe (2001) notes that whereas the nonhuman is not strictly social in the conventional social science sense it is certainly`sociable'. Although the concern with categorisation is necessarily continuous with the apprehension of a relational, sociable materiality, we wish to maintain a nominal distinction for our discursive purposes. We offer a vocabulary suited to examining surveillance of the nonhuman. In this analytical conceit we distinguish between categorisation-as-worldview and materiality.
The term`worldview' is used here to denote an embodied human system of categorisation that gives rise to behaviours. The concept has moved some theoretical distance from being used to denote the overarching philosophy or belief system of a group to contemporary anthropological studies that examine how many different worldviews can be maintained in a common social space (Rapport and Overing, 2000) . Worldview is linked with studies of classification in a broad sense (Rapport and Overing, 2000) and more specifically with the study of spoken language and the mental constructs and categories resulting from language learning (Fishman, 1985; Whorf, 1956) . Although discounting none of this work, we are more interested in the sense in which worldview is seen as something that exists prior to action, that``behaviour is what world-view gives onto if the latter is translated into action'' (Rapport and Overing, 2000, page 395). Geertz (1973) has gone even further and suggested that worldview should refer to an intellectual view of the world, distinct from emotional outlook. In that sense a worldview can be seen as a set of more or less fixed cognitive categories for organising sensory input and abstract thought. As a mental map, a worldview is also an ideal; as the consideration of boundaries above suggests, it does not necessarily correspond to the material world. As embodied categorisations, worldviews are also easily transferable from one set of material circumstances to another as humans engage in multiple worlds of practice.
In order to tie worldview to materiality we will use the idea of`ordering'. In an explanation of the precarious status accorded by (postdualist) material-semiotic analysis to any apparently stable (social) order (seen as a heterogeneous association of materials), Law (1992) states that order is multiple. Moreover, he uses the term`ordering' to indicate the ongoing, processual nature of the work that props up an order. This process equates with Akrich and Latour's (1992) material-semiotic description of the production of meaning as``how one privileged trajectory is built, out of an indefinite number of possibilities'' (page 259). Law elaborated on the process of ordering in his book Organizing Modernity (1994). In an ethnographic study of organisational behaviour at a laboratory, Law identified a range of implicit strategies that drove the work maintaining the organisation; he called these implicit strategies`modes of ordering'. Modes of ordering run through and are carried along with materially heterogeneous processes (Law, 1994) . More recently, Law and Mol (2002) have talked of knowledge in terms of ordering, as the reduction of the world's complexity to more simple orders; but, as Law has previously stated, knowledge``always takes material forms'' (Law, 1992 , page 2). Significantly, when simplified orders`interfere' with each other they generate complexity [Law and Mol (2002) , but see Law (2000) for an example of interference between strategies]. The ordering of things can be a conceptual exercise; a worldview is a particular ordering of things into categories. Yet ordering is also material; it involves the assembly of materials into particular configurations. We refer to these configurations öthese continuously made and reinforced ordersösimply as materialities. Different modes of ordering produce different material orders, or materialities. In the modes of ordering talked about by Law (and Mol) there is always a human component. In this paper we demonstrate that modes of ordering can be discerned where there is no human activity at all. What distinguishes human modes of ordering is the presence of worldviews entwined with the implicit strategies, worldviews that can be translated into new materialities through processes of ordering. Modes of ordering are also portable within worldviews.
In the light of this theoretical discussion (and that of the previous section) surveillance can be conceptualised as an emerging mode of ordering that takes the construction of bounded categories as central to the control of humans. However, surveillance is not fundamentally about control of the person (though this is often both method and result), but about control of information and activity, the category and the action. It is therefore possible to see surveillance in geographical terms, particularly in the context of industrialised societies, as a technocratic form of territoriality, the limiting of mobility through the construction of boundaries. It is the determination of particular spaces and relationships to those spaces through categorisation, boundary maintenance (in terms of both space and identity), observation, and enforcement. Surveillance, in its most extremely territorialised manifestations depends therefore on the purity of categories, and on the cleanest possible demarcations between themöwhat Graham refers to in passing as``the precision of _ boundary maintenance' ' (1998, page 499) . Without boundaries categories dissolve, and the enforcement of territoriality through surveillance becomes impossible. However, the most subtle and successful boundaries are imprecise or more accurately they allow different speeds of movement and different actants to move in variable ways in relation to the boundary; they are differentially permeable. Turning the model on its side and looking at it from the point of view of mobility rather than territory, one can see a series of different geographies of mobility overlaid like a palimpsest, with territoriality cutting through them in jagged and uneven ways.
The materialities of FMD and the practice of biosecurity The FMD epidemic and the actions surrounding it that came to total a crisis were precipitated in part by the activity of a virus (the FMDv). The extent of the epidemic and the actions taken to halt it were the result of other more established materialities, themselves maintained by particular ordering processes. In this section the actions of the virus are described as a process of ordering that results in a strange materiality through interference with established materialities. Accounts of the wider transformations that this process then wrought in the rural economy and mechanisms of rural governance can be found elsewhere (for example, Donaldson et al, 2002; Ward et al, 2003) . Here, the focus is on one particular set of practices set up in opposition to the action of the virus, those of biosecurity.
Viruses are not strictly`alive' in that they do not feed or respire, but they are made out of the same building blocks as living organisms (proteins, fats, and nucleic acids). The only inherent potential a virus has is to produce more virus. In order to do this a virus must interact with the cellular machinery of a complex organism; it has no capacity to self-reproduce (see, for example, Darnell et al, 1990 ). This process is entirelỳ material'; that is to say, the actions of a virus are entirely a result of the physical properties of its structure. The basic unit of any virus is known as a virion; this is defined as the total infective particle of the virusöeverything required to exist outside of a host organism and able to enter an organism's cells. Individual FMDv virions are particularly simple, consisting of a nonenveloped (that is, having no layer of fats), icosohedral protein capsid (or shell) containing a single-stranded molecule of ribonucleic acid (RNA). The molecule of RNA encodes the entirety of the genome of the virus. Once inside an animal (usually via the lungs) the structure of the protein capsid allows the virion to be transported across the host cell membrane by cellular functions that have evolved to transport the molecules required by the cell's normal operation. Once inside a cell, viral RNA also becomes part of the processes of normal cell function. Some associates with ribosomes, which convert genetic codes into proteins via a process known as translation. Ribosomes simply translate any code that they come into contact with; they cannot tell self from alien and thus translate viral RNA into capsid proteins. Other viral RNA forms replication complexes on the smooth endoplasmic reticulum, a cellular component which is again a relatively simple mechanism for replicating genetic material. From there, new viral RNA is produced. Some of this new RNA feeds back into the protein-building and genetic-replication processes and the rest joins with capsid proteins forming new virions. Eventually, either the cell bursts under the increased hydrostatic pressure caused by the presence of the virions, or the virions are enveloped in a vesicle and ejected from the cell. Some virions will infect new cells whilst others collect to form the symptomatic blisters visible around an animal's hooves and mouth, which give rise to the name of the disease. From there, the virus can be released into the surrounding environment. The virus is also excreted by the animal in urine, faeces, and expired air, and secreted in saliva and milk.
Looking at the action of the FMDv in this reductive way aptly illustrates a process of material ordering. The physical structure of the virus results in physical changes ö reorderingöin the systems of a host animal without any need for activities such as thought or representation. However, this frame of reference offers no insight into why FMD has such massive impacts on social and economic systems. Determining this requires a shift in perspective. Although not normally fatal, FMD can kill old, young, or infirm animals and it does cause suffering. Although the disease is detrimental to animal welfare, this could be remedied through treatment. However, animals that recover from FMD are less productive and hence have less economic value. It was this effect of the disease that originally led to the introduction of uncompromising control measures intended to eliminate the disease. A`stamping out' policy of culling that was already applied to cattle plagueöa disease which did wipe out stock en masseöwas extended to FMD in the 1860s as a result of lobbying by influential and wealthy animal breeders who stood to experience significant financial loss as a result of their livestock's decreased reproductive capability (Woods, 2001 ). The introduction of national control measures eventually led to the emergence of international measures to prevent the spread of FMD through the control of trade. Under international export regimes, regulated by the World Trade Organisation and the Office International des E è pizooties, FMD-free status is required to export meat. This regulation öitself a form of surveillance based on a categorical distinction between diseased and disease-free livestock populationsöhas come to be the principal component in the existence of FMD as a predominantly economic disease.
International markets and their attendant export controls are modes of ordering and are themselves based on more complex systems of categorisation that dictate relative values. These orderings then help dictate (along, of course, with many other such processes) the particular materialities of livestock farming. Significantly, elements of the properly ordered materialities of livestock farming actually act in favour of the virus. The virus has no ability to orderöno direct influence over materialityöoutside of a host organism. In the spaces of livestock farming, the FMD virus produces an alien set of reorderings that interferes with the properly ordered materialities of production and consumption. However, the strange materiality of FMD actually results from the fact that the wholly nonhuman mode of ordering of the virus is supported by hybrid modes; spatial forms of material ordering inherent in modern livestock farming coincidentally transport infected stock and virions locally, nationally, and internationally. It is these incidental movements of virus that biosecurity seeks to curtail, through a diverse set of activities that should ultimately become routine, a fixed part of the ordering that holds the materialities of livestock farming together over time. However, as this account will demonstrate, the geographies of biosecurity underwent shifts in scale, representation, and knowledge content in order to meet these demands.
The term`biosecurity' entered into common usage in the United Kingdom during the 2001 FMD epidemic. Pig farmers may have understood its meaning after the procedures that they were encouraged to follow after the classical swine fever epidemic of the previous year, but, for the most part, livestock farmers and the general public were unfamiliar with the term [Anderson, 2002; personal (Hansard, 2001) . Biosecurity refers to a number of measures intended to stop the incidental transmission of FMD through normal farming practices. Mostly this involves the cleansing and disinfecting of people, clothing, vehicles, and machinery at key pointsöfor example, when moving onto or off farm premises, when moving between different areas on a farm, or when moving between distinct groups of animals. The disinfectant matting seen across many roads during the epidemic was also a form of biosecurityöalbeit an often less than successful form (Anderson, 2002) . These biosecurity measures are not intended to wipe out the virus completely, but to form a barrier of sortsöa boundaryöpast which the virus cannot be carried by people or their machines.
FMD was confirmed in the United Kingdom on 21 February 2001, resulting in a total ban on animal movements through the precautionary designation of the whole of Great Britain as an infected area. An information sheet explaining biosecurity and offering advice on its practice was posted to livestock farmers by the Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Food (MAFF) on 4 March; the information was also available from the MAFF website. Further information was distributed in April and May. A video was distributed on 6 Julyöand also later made available on the website now belonging to MAFF's successor, the new Department of Environment Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA)öwhich showed the Chief Vet, Jim Scudamore, demonstrating the practical principles of biosecurity. Areas with extremely high numbers of cases were targeted for visits by government ministers, senior members of the State Veterinary Service, and representatives from the Chief Scientific Advisor's FMD Science Group. However, these visits were more about emphasising the importance of biosecurity, rather than about advising on its practice (personal interview with member of the FMD Science Group, 13 February 2002; Government, 2002) . Mention of biosecurity by government ministers was often made in such a way as to suggest that continued spread of FMD was down to the lax biosecurity of farmers.
A breakdown of the probable routes of FMD transmission indicates that, although the initial national spread was through long-distance animal movements (prior to the discovery of FMD), later spread was through means classified as local.`Local' meant likely infection from another farm premises within 3 km, when a number of possible means of infection could be identified öfor example, movement of people or vehicles or proximity of animals. The successful prevention of spread of the disease in many areas with infected premises has been attributed to good biosecurity. However, despite the continual discursive reinforcement of the importance of good biosecurity, the resources were not available throughout the first five months of the epidemic to monitor and enforce biosecurity physically. Consequently biosecurity practice is thought to have been lax, largely because of the difficulties it posed to normal farming practices.
By the end of July, when a large outbreak centred on Thirsk in North Yorkshire began to cause concern, FMD was present only in geographically isolated pockets and more resources were available. As a result a new policy tool was introduced. The`restricted infected area' was also known as a`blue box' because of the coloured ink used to demarcate its boundaries on a map. In total, three blue boxes were established: one around Thirsk from 29 July, one around Penrith from 7 August, and one around Hexham and Allendale from 26 August. The Thirsk blue box was the model for the latter two and was maintained until 14 September 2001, its roughly square area encompassing 1173 livestock farms.
Any vehicle visiting a farm premises within the blue box required a license in advance. DEFRA officers supervised over 4500 such visits.Vehicles entering and leaving the area were disinfected at roadblock disinfectant stations utilising high-pressure hoses rather than drive-over matting. The blue box was subdivided into 6 areas, each with 15 patrols a day by North Yorkshire County Council Trading Standards Service officers (who were the statuary body defined under animal health legislation) accompanied by police escorts. During the existence of the blue box, the patrols carried out 5000 spot-checks on vehicles to determine if the drivers were following biosecurity regulations. The designation of the restricted infected area made biosecurity legally enforceable; 77 infringements of biosecurity were considered as possibly meriting prosecution in the Thirsk blue box.
The new territorial form of disease control represented by the restricted infected areas did not supplant the earlier geography of control, but rather cut across it.
The microgeography of biosecurity existed within individual farm premises through the categorisation of clean and dirty areas and different livestock areas and the cleansing of persons, clothing, equipment, etc between those areas, for which farmers were responsible. From the beginning of the epidemic, farms were the basic territorial unit of disease control measures and were subject to various categorisations that defined specific actions and restrictions. When disease was suspected on a farm it was put immediately under form A status either until such time as a negative result was obtained or until after cleansing and restocking if the disease was confirmed. Once FMD was confirmed a farm became designated as infected premises (IP) and an immediate movement ban was regulated by enforcement (police or trading standards officers posted at the farm entrance). Confirmation could be given either by a positive serological test for FMD antibodies, or by veterinary observation of clinical symptoms. If, after a clinical confirmation of FMD, serological testing proved negative, farms remained classified as IP because of the possibility that the animals may still have been infected. After the designation of an IP, a protection zone was set up with a radius of 3 km around the IP. Farms within this area were subject to form D restrictions, which limited movement of stock and animal products onto and off farm by license and legally imposed biosecurity measures (which were otherwise voluntary). Form D restrictions could be imposed upon any premises where observation was to be used rather than immediate slaughter. Any farm where stock were thought to have been exposed to infection either through direct contact with infected animals or through indirect transmission was designated as a dangerous contact (DC); a subgrouping known as contiguous premises (CP) referred to those farms which were adjacent to an IP. The treatment imposed on DCs and CPs varied throughout the course of the epidemic. At the height of the slaughter, IPs were supposed to be culled out within 24 hours of confirmation and CPs within the following 24 hours. This was the so-called 24/48 policy that caused much controversy owing to the slaughter of potentially healthy animals in order to create`firebreaks'. By the time of the blue boxes, the treatment of CPs was subject to local discretion. This had been introduced for cattle earlier in the epidemic then further reduced to mandatory serological surveillance for all species on CPs, involving regular blood tests for stock.
Form A and D restrictions, IPs, DCs, and protection zones are part of the European Union's regulations for combating FMD, which must be complied with through the production of a contingency plan in each member state. CPs and the policies applied to them were introduced in the United Kingdom during the epidemic, as were the restricted infected areas. These blue boxes worked through imposition of form D restrictions on every farm within their area, thus allowing for legally enforceable biosecurity. They were in essence a consolidation of multiple protection zones in disease hotspots and the level of resources necessary to impose and police them was available only as the epidemic tailed off.
The blue boxes were hailed as a success in bringing the epidemic to a halt. Some have called for the`draconian measures' of blue boxes over tightly defined areas, rather than the national wholesale slaughter of animals that preceded them, to be used in any future epidemic (personal interview with NFU representative, 14 December 2001). Both the FMD Lessons Learned Inquiry and The Royal Society Inquiry on Infectious Disease in Livestock called for new biosecurity plans to be drawn up (Anderson, 2002; The Royal Society, 2002) . However, the future of biosecurity regulation seems uncertain. A recent scientific`Horizon Scanning' exercise conducted within DEFRA recommended that biosecurity should be a priority for research, including research into the possibilities of moving it`offshore' (DEFRA, 2002). Shortly after that a biosecurity consultation was sent out by DEFRA containing guidelines on voluntary biosecurity which were focused on individual farm premises and did little more than reiterate the guidance given out during the FMD epidemic (DEFRA, 2003) .
The consequences of categorisation
The power of worldviews that have been successfully translated into materialities through material reorderings can be seen in several different aspects of the FMD epidemic. For one, there are the much-debated reasons behind why FMD is fought at all. The worldview underpinning FMD control is a key determinant to the trajectories of the materialities that unfold when FMD is discovered. Also of interest here is the established method of dealing with the disease, not much talked about throughout this paper. The slaughter of infected animals derives from a worldview in which the category of the virus does not exist; there are only healthy animals or diseased animals. Therefore, the removal of the disease requires the removal of animals. However, since this control method was introduced another has arisen from a worldview that apprehends the materiality of disease in a more sophisticated way and does permit the category of the virus. Vaccination can be used to prevent animals from becoming infected; effectively creating a materiality that is hostile to the virus. Yet, such is the power of the materiality supporting slaughter that vaccination has had a subordinate role. The position of vaccinated animals within national and international food chains is at best unclear (Anderson, 2002) . What both of these worldviews have in common is that they rely on the direct and visible control of nonhumans, a material ordering carried out by human experts (vets and licensed slaughterhouse workers) acting in ways that they have been trained for. As we noted earlier, the interference of different ordersöin this case particular worldviewsöwith each other generates complexity (Law and Mol, 2002) . The notion of biosecurity distorts both of these worldviews and adds further confusion to the complexity of crisis, which it must then manage.
The spread of FMD across farms is actually the expansion of the materiality of the FMDv within farming materialities. Without removing this strange materiality (the collection of reordered entities now categorised as diseased animals) from the farming materiality there is no way to remove completely the virus itself. Whereas biosecurity (like vaccination) tacitly acknowledges that different material elements of the disease must be kept separate, it actually relies (unlike vaccination) on controlling human behaviour in order to control the virus. In the end, the most effective way of doing this is simply to ensure the correct behaviour is being performed, regardless of whether the rationale for the behaviour is understood, and behaviour becomes solid as it is embedded in materials (Latour, 1991) öas worldview is translated into materiality. The geography of biosecurity became ever more obdurately material as the epidemic progressed, largely as a result of the increasing resources that were directed at it. The whole ordering of the materiality of FMD control was altered largely because of the lessening of material constraints. Biosecurity shifted from concept to ideology and advice, lines on maps shifted to materially maintained boundariesöfirst of disinfectant mats then of police cars, roadblocks, and disinfecting crews with their machinery. As the FMDv does not recognise the delineation between one farm and another (they are human categories and territories, despite the preponderance of nonhuman elements), boundaries had to be set up which could encompass the material geography of the virus.
Globally, biosecurity is a part of disease surveillance, intimately tied up in border controls where the monitoring of incoming biological materials can be tightly controlled and the security of territories maintained. UK organisations such as the NFU have called for the tightening of such controls along the lines employed in Australia and New Zealand (NFU, 2002) . In those places, biosecurity poster campaigns, signs, and sanitary disposal points form part of the materials of border control, the set of territorial devices which enforce the differential permeability of national borders. However, biosecurity as it was first introduced to farmers during the UK FMD epidemic was somewhat different to this in that it lacked a large-scale surveillant component. Biosecurity was described solely as cleansing and disinfecting practices in order to maintain a boundary around farm premises. This information was distributed in a letter, and was not considered to have been effective as evidenced by the continued local transmission of FMD (Anderson, 2002) . Biosecurity became effective only when it became part of a materiality supported by surveillant processes, when it became`surveillance biosecurity'. Categorical area designations, such as IP and protection zone, formed part of a network of information gathering, mapping, and simulation aimed at controlling movement and the logistics of disease controlöin other words a surveillance system. This system, constituted from epidemiologists, logisticians, field officers, and their vehicles, communications and computing equipment, was similar to many involved in disease control, whether human or animal, which operate constantly throughout the world. The increasing materiality of biosecurity, the introduction of the blue boxes, was actually an incorporation of farmoriented biosecurity into a surveillance materialityöa territory ordered by surveillant processesöwhich could control biosecurity through the enforcement of categories (the form D restrictions).
What emerges from this is a picture of surveillance as a thing in itself, as was posited earlier. It is a mode of ordering that can be added to others and aid in the translation of other worldviews. It can thus be described, in a similar way to that in which Latour described modernity, as``a force added to others that it _ has the power to represent, to accelerate, or to summarize '' (1993, page 40 ). Yet, Latour sees the power of modernity as waning, whereas the influence of surveillance is on the increase. The categorisations and worldviews that surveillance biosecurity underpinned during FMD quickly became things that had to be maintained in their own right, almost regardless of fighting the disease. Categories retained preeminence over materialities that contradicted them. Once a farm was designated as an IP it remained so, regardless of the results of serological tests that could detect the presence of the virus. The existence of stable categories offered a degree of certainty and a sense of control to the politicians managing the crisis, in contrast to the uncertainties of the highly mobile strange materiality of the virus. In his discussion of another agricultural epidemic, the BSE crisis, Hinchliffe (2001) notes the tendency of policymakers to assume a``staid natural order'' and to underestimate``natural indeterminacy''. Surveillance biosecurity offers an approach that sidesteps the indeterminacy of the disease (although this is considerably lessened in the case of the better-known FMD compared with the case of BSE) by proposing that the maintenance of static territorial integrity can disrupt the disease materiality. It also requires a relatively more easily achieved goal of politicians: the control of humans.
The principal spatial category maintained by surveillance biosecurity was the individual farm premises. The use of individual farms as the basic unit of organisation in disease control could only ever be an approximation of the viral geography, yet it appears that the approximation was (eventually) accurate enough to end the epidemic. It may have been that the rigid maintenance of territories allowed for a more focused overall management. The logic behind using the already existent category of the farm premises in biosecurity is sound: a farm, rather than necessarily an animal, is the basic unit from which the virus needs to be excluded. A farm is the basic unit of materialeconomic translation in global agri-food markets. Any problems in biosecurity initially resulted from the fact that farm boundaries proved unenforceable individually because of material contingencies, necessitating a rescaling of the operation and a refocusing of resources and strategy toward the management of humans.
The full significance of this surveillant control of people has apparently been missed by the government lesson-learning process. Post-FMD there has been a return to biosecurity as a voluntary, farm-based activity, with the effective removal of the topdown surveillance element, despite the fact that this approach has demonstrably failed in the past. Biosecurity succeeded only as part of a surveillant materiality. This could be the result of an emerging new worldview: a recognition that the categories and assumptions employed in combating FMD were fundamentally flawed, that they in fact resulted in many of the social and economic impacts that were attributed to the disease (Donaldson et al, 2002) . On the whole, though, it appears that, rather than a major shift in the worldview underpinning disease control, a spatial strategy will be employed to minimise impacts in any future epidemic. Resources and control will be more carefully targeted toward specific areas, through new disease information and animal-movement monitoring systems, with increased use of GIS. As a result of the FMD epidemic, farmers in the United Kingdom are being drawn ever further into an evolving surveillant materiality, with the potential once more to encompass biosecurity practice should the need arise.
Finally, there are wider global political implications for an invigorated surveillance biosecurity. If, as seems possible, the United Kingdom adopts increased surveillance at the permeable boundary that is the national border, the scales of surveillance biosecurity will have been shifted. Given the enthusiasm for arguments about the increasing irrelevance of national borders in the 1990s in the face of economic globalisation, it does seem ironic that animal diseasesöalong with the (not entirely unrelated) threat of bioterrorism, and the ongoing issue of international immigrationöare offering an opportunity for the reconfiguration and strengthening of borders. Such a reconfiguration can be justified in the case of FMD by recourse to the transnational surveillance of trade standards. Instead of``living on thin air'' as Leadbeater's 1999 global cybereconomy propaganda put it, we are faced with``things'' that``strike back'' (Latour, 2000) , defining their thing-ness by their obduracy and contrariness to the classificatory schema of human worldviews and the machinations of human agency.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we identified two gaps in contemporary studies of surveillance: a lack of consideration of the surveillance of the nonhuman and an inadequate consideration of space. We have suggested that surveillance can be seen as a mode of ordering that enmeshes humans and nonhumans, bringing about the translation of categorical worldviews into materialities. We have taken the example of FMD as a particular nonhuman materiality that ostensibly became subject to surveillance under the auspices of biosecurity. FMD, though, is a strange materiality. The worldviews in which it does not belong are based on political and economic systems; they are only partially rooted in the material nature of the virus's activity. Certainly from a purely functional material perspective, the virus can belong nowhere other than where it must be to fulfil its lifecycle. Biosecurity must necessarily involve the surveillance of strange materialities because it seeks to exclude those strange elements that are not desirable to certain modes of ordering, yet which exist in other modes that intersect those which biosecurity seeks to uphold. Strange materialities arise because of the propensity of the nonhuman to object to human worldviews (Hinchliffe, 2001; Latour, 2000) ; they generate complexity and cannot be encompassed by one worldview. An agri-business categorisation that desires to exclude FMD requires a scientific categorisation that permits it in order to carry out the work of exclusion. Therefore, the surveillance of strange materialities requires the management of mixed expectations based in differing worldviews. This is categorical work (Bowker and Star, 1999) and is undertaken in surveillant order by the enforcement of common categories through the imposition of particular behaviours. The most significant element of the surveillant control of nonhumans involved in FMD biosecurity was the surveillant control of humans.
In looking at the way in which surveillance deals with the incursion of a virus, we found a needöand a desireöto shift our analysis between material scales, suggesting something of much wider importance. Although we studied an animal disease, the same principles apply in humans. The analytical metaphor of materiality implies a basic structural resemblance that permits an easy shifting in scales, allowing us to consider humansöand their interaction with the worldöon a cellular or molecular level. Yet how`human' would it seem for us to know ourselves on such a level? With the advance of medical technologies and biotechnologies, along with the creep of surveillant processes, there is the increasing likelihood that the strange materialities that surveillance seeks to grapple with will be in some way parts of ourselves. We should not forget that humans would be in different relative positions of power within any given surveillant materialityöthere is always the potential for domination. Geographers are developing new vocabularies and embodying new worldviews that can better explain the continuities between the human and the nonhuman and inherent sociability of materiality. We can critically engage with the multiple material geographies of surveillance as they emerge, and question their categorisations. We must remember that worldviews are just that: views of the world to which the world can object.
